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Abstract
Stock option programs constitute an important economic domain both for the issuing companies
and for their employees. Little is known, however, about which individual variables actually drive
exercise patterns and how employees value their stock options. We study the following set of research
questions to provide a contribution to a better understanding of these topics: How do employees
exercise and value stock options? What are the determinants of exercise decisions and subjective
option values? Do employees exercise options from different grants in a consistent way? Are subjective
option values consistent with individuals’ exercise decisions? We are able to use a unique data set
combining employee-level option exercises with subjective option values extracted by means of an
internal survey. Furthermore, we can combine this data with a wide set of individual variables. We
find that employees exercise their stock options well before expiration. The median individual sacrifices
more than 90% of the option’s lifetime by exercising early. Surprisingly, we also find that individuals
substantially overvalue the options they received. We show that exercise dates and option values
are unrelated with measures of risk aversion. Loss aversion, however, does a better job in explaining
the heterogeneity in option values. We also document that optimism and overconfidence measures
are significantly related to option values. We show that managers that are very optimistic about
company stock place higher values on their options. This finding is consistent with the sentiment
hypothesis presented in Oyer and Schaefer (2004) and Bergman and Jenter (2004). Some evidence
for an intertemporal consistency of exercises decisions is also provided. However, we find only weak
support for the hypothesis that higher option values are associated with later exercise decisions.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Recent academic research has provided many theoretical and empirical insights on com-
pensation with employee stock options (ESOs). Researcher investigated issues like the
reasons for the use of stock options, the effects of ESOs on firm performance, the economic
costs of options, or the question of whether or not stock options provide opportunities for
manipulations and the use of insider information.1
Despite current progress in the understanding of how stock options work, only little is
known about the variables that actually drive individual-level exercise decisions. More-
over, it is still relatively unexplored how employees subjectively value the stock options
they received. Core et al. (2003) therefore conclude in their survey on equity-based com-
pensation that “an interesting question for future research is to examine how executives
actually value their stock options.”2 This lack of empirical research is merely due to
widespread data limitations in the field of ESO plans. To get a deeper understanding of
the outlined issues, employee-level data on exercise transactions, subjective option val-
ues, and individual characteristics (like risk aversion, stockholdings or loss aversion) is
crucial. However, companies usually hesitate to provide detailed data on their employees’
stock option exercises. Moreover, they are generally very reluctant in allowing researchers
to contact their employees in order to ask them questions about their subjective option
valuations and individual traits.
This lack of data is unfortunate as studying exercise decisions and subjective option
valuations of employees in ESO programs is very important as the following paragraphs
will show.
The accounting costs of stock option programs crucially depend on how employees value
and exercise their options.3 Existing accounting rules allow firms to adjust the time param-
eter used in estimating the costs of stock options to account for early exercise decisions.
Firms can use, for example, modified valuation models that include the expected time
1Reviews covering these topics are provided by Murphy (1999), Core et al. (2003) or Sautner (2005).
2Core et al. (2003), p. 43.
3Note that exercise decisions and subjective option values are related as individuals that place a lower value on their
ESOs exercise at earlier points in time (see below for details).
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until options are exercised instead of the original time to maturity as an input parameter
(see, e.g., Hull and White, 2004). Not taking into account early exercises would imply
adverse effects on firms’ reported earnings as it results in an overestimation of the ESO
programs’ accounting costs.4 A precise estimation of the expected life of ESOs hence re-
quires an understanding of how employees actually value and exercise their options, and to
what extend these values/exercises vary with individual characteristics (and hence differ
within an organization).
Economic models on stock option compensation assume that individuals understand how
the incentive effects of stock options work and how the value of option packages is deter-
mined. But if option holders do not understand the basics behind stock option plans, e.g.
if they systematically misprice options, then it is likely that the intended incentive effects
of stock options do not work efficiently either (see Core et al., 2003)
Heterogeneous and possibly incorrect option valuations further matter for the general ef-
ficiency of stock options as a compensation device. If some individuals heavily discount
option values while others value them highly, then efficient contracting suggests that indi-
viduals with low option valuations should rather be remunerated with other compensation
forms that produce lower costs for the issuing firm (see Massey, 2003b). To assess the ef-
ficiency of option compensation, an estimate of individuals’ subjective option values is
therefore needed.
Only little empirical research explicitly links exercise decisions and subjective option val-
ues with psychological biases.5 This is particularly unfortunate as some recent compen-
sation models combine psychological biases and option compensation: The models by
Bergman and Jenter (2004) as well as Oyer and Schaefer (2005) connect excessive em-
ployee optimism with option compensation using a sentiment story. They predict that
employees generally do not value their options as suggested by existing valuation mod-
els and argue that firms grant stock options when their boundedly rational employees
are overoptimistic. Empirical research on whether optimism really affects the subjective
valuation of options is, however, far from mature and survey-based research is needed to
4Recall that new accounting rules require firms to expense the costs of ESO plans. See IFRS 2 “Share-based Payment”
for IAS/IFRS and FASB Exposure Draft “Share-based Payment” for US-GAAP.
5See Heath et al. (1999) or Massey (2003b) for exceptions.
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understand managers’ expectations.
Having hinted why we think it is important to study individual-level exercise decisions,
option values and their respective determinants, we can now formulate the research ques-
tions that we want to address empirically:
• How do employees exercise and value their stock options?
• What are the rational and psychological determinants of exercise decisions and sub-
jective option values?
• Do individuals exercise options from different grants in a consistent way?
• Are subjective option values consistent with individuals’ exercise decisions?
We believe that combining data on option exercises with survey data is a very effective
way to address these research questions as it bypasses some of the main problems the
existing ESO literature faces.6 We are able to link detailed and individual-specific data
on exercise transaction form managers working for a large German DAX company with
survey data on ESO values. We can further combine this data with a large set of personal
characteristics.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Employees in our data set exercise
their options well before expiration and hereby sacrifice a significant proportion of the
fair option values. If individuals are directly asked about how they subjectively value a
specific stock option, they surprisingly state values that are substantially above the fair
option value: employees assign a mean value of 31.21 Euro to an option with a fair value
of about 26 Euro. We find that exercise decisions and option values are unrelated with
measures of risk aversion. However, we find that employees with a highly firm-specific
human capital discount their options more heavily. We provide evidence suggesting that
more wealthy managers exercise later as they have more funds to diversify. Overall, our
results indicate that psychological rather than rational variables are associated with ESO
6Existing research on option exercises regularly assumes certain parameter values, e.g. for risk aversion, to study ex-
ercise patterns of individuals in ESO programs (see Bettis et al., 2005, Oyer and Schaefer, 2005 or Carpenter, 1998). As
these parameter values show large variation across individuals, using fixed parameter values in calibration exercises is not
unproblematic.
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values. We find, for example, that optimism and overconfidence measures are significantly
related to option values. Managers that are more optimistic about company stock and
the stock market as a whole place higher values on their ESOs. This finding is consistent
with the sentiment hypothesis presented by Oyer and Schaefer (2004) and Bergman and
Jenter (2004). Moreover, we find that more overconfident employees put a lower value
on their options which is in line with the findings in Sautner and Weber (2005). We
can further show that loss aversion does a better job than risk aversion in explaining
the heterogeneity in option values. We also provide some evidence for the intertemporal
consistency of option exercises: employees that exercised early in one grant also did so
in an other one. However, our findings offer only weak support for the hypothesis that
higher option values are generally associated with later exercise decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related empirical
research that studies exercise decisions in ESO programs and the values employees place
on their stock options. The data sets, the company, institutional details of the stock option
grants, and the methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains descriptive
results on exercise patterns and subjective option values. If further defines the variables
gathered by our questionnaire and presents summary statistics on individual characteris-
tics. Section 5 studies the determinants of individuals’ exercise decisions and their option
values. Moreover, it investigates whether exercise decisions and elicited option values are
consistent with each other. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our results and concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Empirical Research on Stock Option Exercise Decisions
This subsection surveys the empirical literature that studies exercise decisions of individu-
als in ESO programs. The subsequent subsection will then look at research that explicitly
analyzes how individuals subjectively value stock options they received. Based on this
brief literature review, we will show how our study extends the existing body of research
on option exercises and values.
We already noted that data on employee behavior in ESO plans is highly confidential and
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causes a lack of empirical studies in the field.7 Core and Guay (2001) study aggregated
exercise decisions of non-executives in more than 700 U.S. firms. Among other things, they
document that option exercises are greater when the realizable value of a stock option on
exercise captures a greater percentage of the theoretical Black and Scholes (1973) value.
Bettis et al. (2005) investigate how cross-sectional firm characteristics and management
positions affect option exercises. They use information on employees’ levels in firms as a
proxy to capture the effects of unobserved variables like risk aversion or wealth.8 Bettis
et al. find that individuals working for companies with the largest stock price volatility
exercise their ESOs earlier compared to those working for firms with the lowest volatility.
Moreover, they document that individuals at higher levels hold their ESOs significantly
longer than those at lower ones. This finding is considered evidence consistent with risk
averse individuals that exercise to reduce the exposure to firm specific risk.
The question of how psychological factors influence exercise decisions was first studied
by Heath et al. (1999) and Huddart and Lang (1996). They show that option exercises
take place well before expiration. The maximum permissible number of options has been
exercised by many employees shortly after the first vesting anniversary. The major contri-
bution of the their studies, however, is that they predict and find that exercise decisions
and psychological variables are related. They hereby document two psychological biases.
The first one reflects employees’ beliefs that short-term price trends will reverse and that
long-term price trends will persist. The second bias relates to the tendency of individuals
to set reference points. Based on psychological research, they presume that employees set
reference points with respect to stock price levels attained during the previous year. Con-
sistent with this conjecture, they find that exercise activity increases immediately when
the stock price exceeds the maximum price level set at some point of time during the
preceding year.9
Massey (2003a) matches detailed data on exercise decisions of employees working for a
7The scarcity of publicly available data is even more pronounced for broad-based option programs as U.S. firms need to
publish information only on option exercises by top executives, but not on those by lower-level employees. The behavior of
individuals trading in exchange-traded stock options is studied by Poteshman and Serbin (2003).
8They hereby assume that lower level employees are more risk averse or have more of their financial and human capital
invested in the firm.
9Core and Guay (2001) confirm these biases using their much broader sample.
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Fortune 100 company with a set of demographic characteristics. He studies the decision
of whether or not to exercise ESOs from a given option grant during a specific week
and hereby finds that exercise decisions are sensitive to behavioral factors (the short-
term stock performance), the volatility of the option, the time-to-maturity, and to an
individual’s experience with ESOs. However, demographic characteristics and exercise
activity seem to be unrelated in his study.
Detailed exercise data from a large German company was analyzed by Sautner and Weber
(2005). They link exercise decisions with survey data on individuals’ characteristics, atti-
tudes, and expectations. Among other things, they find that, inconsistent with traditional
ESO theories, exercise behavior is not driven by risk aversion and holdings of company
stock. Their findings, however, suggest that exercise decisions depend on the psychological
factors overconfidence and mental accounting.
2.2 Empirical Research on Subjective Stock Option Values
Only few empirical studies investigate how individual employees value the stock options
they are holding. This is mainly due to the prevalent reservation of most firms with respect
to questionnaires on their own ESO plans. Existing studies therefore try to circumvent
this problem by surveying students or newsletter readers with questions on non-existing
virtual stock options.
Lambert and Larcker (2001), for example, base their study on a survey of 122 knowl-
edge@wharton readers. They asked these people how much their employing companies
would have to offer them to return a fully vested but imaginary stock option (they hence
asked for individuals’ certainty equivalents). Their results show that individuals substan-
tially overvalue options relative to the theoretical Black and Scholes (1973) value. Young
employees at low management grades show the highest upward bias in option values.
Lambert and Larcker further document that higher expectations for future stock prices
are correlated with higher option values.
The research by Hodge et al. (2005) is based on a survey conducted with university
students. In line with Lambert and Larcker, they asked their subjects how much money
they would require to exchange an imaginary stock option. They also provide evidence
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suggesting that individuals value ESOs substantially above the Black and Scholes value.
Massey (2003b) studies determinants of subjective option values for a real option program
of a Fortune 100 firm. He finds that risk aversion and stock price expectations are signifi-
cantly related to option values: more risk averse and less optimistic employees place lower
values on their ESOs. Moreover, he documents that loss aversion and mental accounting
are negatively correlated with individuals’ option values, indicating that psychological
considerations also affect subjective ESO valuations.
Our study extends the existing body of literature by linking both subjective option values
and individual-level exercise data. To perform this task, we can use data on three existing
real stock option grants of a German DAX company. Moreover, we can employ survey
data to investigate how a wide set of individual characteristics affects option values and
exercise decisions. Overall, our resulting data set enable us to address questions that have
not yet been studied in the academic literature.10
3 The Data Sets, the Company, and the Stock Option Programs
3.1 The Data Sets and the Company
This subsection describes the two data sources we use. It further contains information
about the company that was providing the stock option data.
The first data set contains individual-level stock option exercise transactions of 182 senior
employees. The data set includes detailed individual-level records of all option exercises
that were executed in two distinct stock option grants (denoted by g=1 and g=2) between
May 2002 and July 2004. The data set further contains information on the grade levels
of the individuals, and on how many options they were granted in the two option series.
The second data set consists of comprehensive data on employee-specific characteristics
like risk aversion, tenure or stock price expectations, and was collected by means of a
questionnaire. The survey data further includes individual-level certainty equivalents for
10At least not to our knowledge.
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the value of a real stock option of a third ESO grant (labelled g=3): we directly asked
each employee on the value he subjectively puts on an unvested option of this third option
series. Our questionnaire was directed to all 182 managers that were included in the first
data set. We received a total of 62 responses yielding in a response rate of 34.07%.11
The survey was conducted in March/April 2005 (with one reminder). To avoid strategic
and untruthful answering, we assured that survey responses are treated confidentially.
In particular, we guaranteed that neither the executive board nor the human resources
department of the firm will be able to access individual survey responses.
The individuals in our data sets belong to the second (n = 19), third (n = 51) and
fourth (n = 112) management level of the firm.12 Seven managers of the second, 20 of
the third, and 35 of the fourth level returned the questionnaire. All employees worked for
the German core unit of the corporation (the so-called Aktiengesellschaft). To make sure
that our results are not based on exercise patterns that are observable only at the level of
the Aktiengesellschaft, we compared exercise patterns in the German unit with aggregate
exercises for the entire company (the Group).13
The company that provided the option data is a member of the German large-cap index
DAX. It is one of the largest in its industry worldwide and employs more than 80,000
people. Extraordinary company-specific events like bankruptcy or financial distress that
might have significantly influenced our results occurred neither during the vesting nor
during the exercise periods of the three option grants.
3.2 The Stock Option Program
This subsection provides institutional details on the stock option program we investigate.
Options of the first grant (g=1) were issued in 1999, and the exercise period within which
options are exercisable ranged between May 2002 and May 2005. The options of the second
grant (g=2) were issued in 2000, and the exercise period is from May 2003 to May 2006.
11Which is a reasonable number for this kind of survey-based research.
12The company did not provide data on exercises by board members.
13See below for details. The Group includes approximately 800 additional employees that are mainly employed outside
Germany (e.g. in the U.S.).
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Options of the third grant (g=3) were issued in March 2003 and were not yet exercisable
when we received the ESO data. The vesting period of the latter options ended in May
2005, and the subsequent exercise period runs until June 2011. Options of all three grants
can only be exercised if at least one out of two performance conditions is met. The first
condition requires that the stock price rises by 30%, given the stock price at the grant date
(absolute performance condition), while the second condition requires that the company
outperforms an industry basket (relative performance condition).
The exercise gain of an option of a certain grant g=i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, also consists of
an absolute and a relative component. Given that the absolute performance condition is
met, the absolute exercise gain Gg=iabsol. is calculated as G
g=i
absol. = (St − X), with X being
the stock price at the grant date and St the company’s stock price at date t. If the relative
performance condition is achieved, the relative exercise gain Gg=irel. is computed as G
g=i
rel. =
2 · (Pcomp.−Pind.) ·X, with Pcomp. and Pind. being the company and industry performance,
respectively (each in %). The total exercise gain, conditioning on both conditions being




rel. . By May 2005, the exercise gains of the three
option grants were as follows: Gg=1absol. = 0, G
g=1
rel. > 0, G
g=2
absol. = 0, G
g=2
rel. > 0, G
g=3
absol. > 0 and
Gg=3rel. = 0.
All employees received stock options if and only if they fulfilled a required stock investment
(RSI). They therefore had to introduce a specific number of company shares into the option
program.14 An individual then received four options for each share of company stock he
introduced into the program. To avoid insider conflicts, the company designed four closed
periods per year within which options are not exercisable at all. Closed periods were set
around calendar dates were quarterly or annual earnings are published. Each closed period
encompasses two to six weeks. The accounting costs of the stock option grants were fully
expensed by the company.
14An individual can invest between 10 and 30% of his annual bonus into shares of company stock. These shares are
then introduced into the ESO program. Individuals are prohibited form disposing over the shares of this required stock
investment (RSI) during the entire vesting period.
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3.3 The Methodology
To reduce potential problems resulting from misinterpretations of the survey questions, we
conducted a pilot survey to incorporate feedback by the company and its employees. We
decided to employ survey methodology because of the following reasons. Extant economic
theory makes predictions about the variables that are supposed to affect subjective option
values and individual exercise decisions (see Lambert et al., 1991 or Hall and Murphy,
2000, 2002). However, these variables are usually not observable. Existing research on
option exercises therefore regularly assumes certain parameter values, e.g. for risk aversion,
to study exercise patterns of individuals in ESO programs (see Bettis et al., 2005, Oyer
and Schaefer, 2005 or Carpenter, 1998). But these parameters show large variation across
individuals and using fixed parameter values in calibration exercises is consequently not
unproblematic. A questionnaire has the potential to bypass these problems by directly
asking individuals about their personal characteristics (see Hodge et al., 2005). The same
kind of reasoning applies to subjective option values. These values are individual-specific
by nature and can not be extracted from market prices as options are usually not traded.
To answer the question of how managers value their stock options, one therefore needs to
ascertain option values by directly contacting individual employees.15
We are aware that studies using survey data have several shortcomings. Examples are
potential non-responses biases, differences in the interpretations of questions, or the prob-
lem of not measuring actions but beliefs.16 However, we think that combining transaction
data with survey data is a promising way to get a better understanding of individual-
level exercise decisions and subjective option valuations. In particular, we think that the
possibility to ask senior employees on how they personally value a fully-fledged real stock
option provides an exciting basis to address our outlined research questions and outweighs
potential survey shortcomings.
15See Ika¨heimo et al. (2004) for an exception.
16See Hodge et al. (2005) for a discussion of these issues in the context of ESO surveys.
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4 Exercise Decisions and Subjective Option Values: Descriptive
Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics on Stock Option Grants and Exercise Patterns
Before discussing the determinants and consistency of exercise decisions and option values,
we summarize aggregate results on the stock option grants and exercise patterns in our
data set. These statistics are useful to get a deeper understanding of the grants that were
made and about the aggregate exercise activity.
Descriptive statistics on the ESO grants and exercises are documented in Table 1. Sum-
mary statistics include the number of options issued in the first (g=1) and second (g=2)
grant, the number of exercises per individual, the realized per-option exercise gains (in
Euro), the overall exercise gains (in Euro), the fraction of the respective option life that was
sacrificed at the date of exercise, and information about the required stock investments.
The table contains means, medians, minimums, maximums and standard deviations of all
variables. Option Life Sacrificed, our measure of early exercise, is defined as follows (see
Bettis et al., 2003):
Option Life Sacrificed =
Number of days the option was exercised prior to expiration
Number of days between vesting and expiration
(1)
If individuals exercised their options at more than one date, weighted averages of the
sacrificed option lifetimes were calculated. The resulting variable ranges between 0 and
1, with higher values indicating that an individual sacrificed a greater proportion of the
option’s life by exercising before maturity. The sample size consists of 182 employees. To
construct the summary statistics for the exercise gains and for Option Life Sacrificed, we
used exercise data only of those employees that have entirely exercised their options (154
individuals in the first and 140 in the second grant).
The table shows that the average manager received 1,116 stock options in first and 1,005
options in the second grant. The figures show substantial differences within the firm, with
granted options ranging from only 72 up to 4,904 in g=1 and from 84 up to 4,676 in g=2.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Stock Option Grants and Exercise Patterns
This table provides descriptive statistics on option grants and exercise patterns. Summary statistics include
the number of options issued in the first (g=1) and second (g=2) option grant, the number of exercises per
individual, the total per-option exercise gain that was realized (in Euro), the overall exercise gain (in Euro),
the fraction of the option life that was sacrificed at the time of exercise, and the percentage of the annual bonus
that was invested within the required stock investment. If individuals exercised options at more than one date,
weighted averages were calculated. The table contains means, medians, minimums, maximums, and standard
deviations of all variables. Option Life Sacrificed is defined as the ratio of the number of days the option
was exercised prior to expiration divided by the number of days between vesting and expiration. Days of the
closed periods were excluded when we calculated this measure of early exercise. The sample size consists of 182
employees. To calculate the exercise gains and Option Life Sacrificed, we only used data of those employees
that have exercised their options entirely (154 for the first and 140 for the second grant). The options of the
first (second) grant were issued in 1999 (2000) and the exercise period ranges between 05/2002 and 05/2005
(05/2003 and 05/2006).
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev.
Options granted in g=1 (per person) 1,116 980 72 4,904 882
Options exercised in g=1 (per person) 987 865 0 4,904 906
Options granted in g=2 (per person) 1,005 852 84 4,676 827
Options exercised in g=2 (per person) 849 704 0 4,676 403
Number of exercises in g=1 (per person) 1.33 1.00 0.00 11.00 1.13
Number of exercises in g=2 (per person) 1.08 1.00 0.00 4.00 0.67
Exercise gain per option in g=1 (per person) 26.85 27.54 20.16 33.79 4.06
Exercise gain per option in g=2 (per person) 36.81 37.45 28.18 41.99 2.50
Overall exercise gain in g=1 (per person) 29,481 23,970 2,383 153,546 24,749
Overall exercise gain in g=2 (per person) 38,025 31,447 3,169 176,425 30,594
Option Life Sacrificed in g=1 0.85 0.91 0.26 1.00 0.18
Option Life Sacrificed in g=2 0.92 0.98 0.59 1.00 0.11
Required Stock Investment in g=1 (in %) 22.94 30.00 10.00 30.00 8.38
Required Stock Investment in g=2 (in %) 21.98 25.00 10.00 30.00 8.68
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By July 2004, about 88% of the options of the first and roughly 84% of the options of
the second grant were already exercised.17 This reflects the general propensity of many
employees to exercise their stock options very early.18 The median employee exercised its
options in one large transactions, but some individuals have spread their options over
several exercises. The mean per-option exercise gain in the first grant was equal to 26.85
Euro. Depending on the exact date of the exercise decisions, realized gains fluctuate
heavily between 20.16 and 33.79 Euro. For the second grant, the mean exercise gains was
36.81 Euro and the per-option profit varies between 28.18 and 41.99 Euro. The median
employees realized an overall exercise gain of 23,970 Euro in the first and 31,447 Euro in
the second ESO grant (which is certainly a significant proportion of the average salary).
The mean value of the variable Option Life Sacrificed is 0.85 (0.92) for the first (second)
grant, indicating that the average employee sacrificed 85% (92%) of the option’s total life
by exercising pre-maturely. In the first grant, individuals on average invested 22.94% of
their annual boni into shares of company stock for the RSI (21.98% in the second grant).19
Recall that individuals could invest between 10 and 30% of their annual boni into shares
for the RSI.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present cumulative option exercises over time as a percentage of
options granted in g=1 and g=2 (Figures are provided in the Appendix). The time dimen-
sion reflects the days after vesting from the viewpoint of the first ESO grant onwards.20
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution for the German core unit of the firm (Ak-
tiengesellschaft), while Figure 2 shows the distribution for the entire company (Group).
Recalling that both grants had an exercise period of roughly three years, these figures
reinforce the conclusion that individuals have a strong tendency to exercise early. A com-
parison of Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicates that the managers of the Aktiengesellschaft
generally have a stronger propensity to exercise early compared to those of the rest of the
corporation.
A distribution of the Option Life Sacrificed variables is presented in Figure 3 (for g=1)
17We received data on exercises executed up to July 2004.
18This finding is consistent with related research (see Huddart and Lang, 1996, Heath et al., 1999, Bettis et al., 2005 or
Sautner and Weber, 2005).
19This variable was available for 177 individuals only.
20The days of the closed periods were excluded when we calculated the time dimension in these figures.
14
and Figure 4 (for g=2).21 For both distributions, the mode of the variable is immediately
after the vesting date. However, the figures show that a significant exercise activity also
occurred during the lives of the the two option grants (reflecting some heterogeneity across
individuals).
Having observed that many employees tend to exercise relatively early, the question arises
whether early exercises were driven by superior private information. We therefore linked
sacrificed option lives and realized exercise profits to investigate whether the data supports
a private information story. Interestingly, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that late exercisers
made a higher exercise profit on average. A correlation analysis also yields a highly sig-
nificant negative correlation coefficient for the first and for the second ESO grant22, and
a simple linear regression model likewise estimates a coefficient of Option Life Sacrificed
equal to -14.12 for the first and -14.21 for the second grant.23 In summary, these results
support the view that early exercisers did not exploit private information profitably.
Finally, Figure 7 presents the relationship between Option Life Sacrificed and the captured
fair option value at the date of exercise (for g=1).24 A low value of the latter variable
indicates that an individual sacrificed a large fraction of the option’s expected value by
exercising. The mean (median) value for this variable is equal to 0.8054 (0.7986), implying
that employees sacrificed about 20% of the option’s fair value when they exercised. This
figure is again consistent with the results documented in related research (see Huddart and
Lang, 1996 or Bettis et al., 2005). A correlation analysis between Option Life Sacrificed
and the captured fair value yields a significant correlation coefficient of Rho = -0.2992
(p-value = 0.0295; n = 53), and a linear regression estimates a coefficient of Option Life
Sacrificed equal to -0.3486 (p-value = 0.000, n = 54, R2 = 0.4359, intercept = 1.1096).
These results show that early exercisers on average forfeited more of the option’s fair
value.25
21The remaining analysis focuses on individuals working for the Aktiengesellschaft.
22Rho = -0.5945 (p-value = 0.0000, n = 152) and Rho = - 0.5675 (p-value = 0.0000, n = 139), respectively.
23With p-value = 0.000, n = 152, R2 = 0.3491, and intercept = 38.87 in the first grant, and p-value = 0.000, n = 139,
R2 = 0.3421, and intercept = 49.92 in the second one.
24Due to the complexity of the option program, fair values were provided on a monthly basis only. They do, however,
provide a good approximation of the fair values at the exercise dates.
25Similar results were found for the second grant (not reported here).
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Table 2: Subjective Option Values
This table provides summary statistics of the subjective stock option values that were stated in the question-
naires (in Euro). We asked individuals for their certainty equivalents of an outstanding and unvested option
of the third ESO grant (g=3). The options of this grant were issued in 2003, vest in 07/2005, and expire in
06/2011. The table presents the mean, the median, the minimum, the maximum, and the standard deviation
of the elicited subjective option values. It further includes the number of observations that was available. The
table also contains information on how many of the stated option values were below (above) the fair option
value (in %). In March 2005, i.e. when most individuals filled in the questionnaire, the fair value of an option
of this grant was equal to 26.13 Euro.
Subjective Option Value (in Euro)
Mean 31.21 Median 30.00
Min. 13.00 Max. 46.00
Std.dev. 8.81 Obs. 61
Stated Value ≤ Fair Value 37.70% Stated Value > Fair Value 62.30%
4.2 Descriptive Results on Subjective Option Values
Having studied aggregate exercise patterns, we now turn to the question of how employees
in our data set subjectively value the options they received. Table 2 provides summary
statistics of the subjective stock option values that were elicited by means of our question-
naire (in Euro). We asked individuals for the certainty equivalent of an outstanding and
unvested option of the third ESO grant (g=3). Recall that the options of this grant were
issued in 2003, vest in July 2005, and expire in June 2011. The table presents the mean,
the median, the minimum, the maximum, and the standard deviation of these elicited
option values. The table further contains information on how many of the stated option
values were below and above the fair option value (in %). In March 2005, i.e. when most
individuals filled in our questionnaire, the fair value of an option of this grant was equal
to 26.13 Euro.
The table shows that individuals on average value their stock options substantially above
the mathematically correct value. More specifically, individuals assign a mean (median)
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value of 31.21 Euro (30.00 Euro) to an option with a fair value of 26.13 Euro. Roughly two-
thirds of the option holders valued their ESOs above this value. The entire distribution
of the stated option values is plotted in Figure 8. The numbers show that, even though
we observe a strong tendency to overvalue options, there is again some heterogeneity
within the organization. Some managers even seem to severely discount the value of their
options. Overall, our finding is in line with related research that also documents this kind
of overvaluation bias in survey studies (see Lambert and Larcker, 2001, Hodge et al.,
2005 and Massey 2003b). Our evidence is highly inconsistent with economic theory that
suggests that individuals should value employee stock options significantly below its fair
value as they are inherently undiversified (see, e.g., Lambert et al., 1991 and Subsection
5.1).
4.3 Descriptive Statistics on Individual Characteristics
We now turn to the individual variables that were gathered by means of our questionnaire.
These variables will later be linked with the exercise data and the ascertained option
values. Table 3 summarizes and defines the variables that are used in the subsequent
empirical analysis.
Risk Aversion 1 measures an employee’s self-reported degree of risk aversion using the
methodology employed in Klos and Weber (2003). Individuals had to divide a given
amount of money, 1,000,000 Euro, between a risky lottery and a safe investment. The
response range was between 0% (if everything was invested in the safe asset) and 100% (if
everything was invested in the risky lottery). Clearly, the lower the proportion of wealth
that is invested in the risky asset, the higher the degree of individual risk aversion. In the
subsequent analysis, we classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response
as high (low). Risk Aversion 2 captures an employee’s degree of risk aversion based on the
certainty-equivalent method.26 The lower the elicited certainty equivalent, the higher the
degree of risk aversion. We again classify answers below (equal to and above) the median
response as high (low). Stockholdings is the ratio of the value of an employee’s company
stockholdings to his total wealth (answers in %). Responses below (equal to and above)
26We elicited certainty equivalents based on a lottery that provides a 50% chance of winning an amount equal to 1,000,000
Euro and a 50% chance of winning nothing (see Klos and Weber, 2003).
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the median response are classified as low (high). Wealth measures an employee’s total
wealth. We proxy wealth by the management grade of an employee in the corporation.
We classify individuals at the second and third management level as high, and those at
the fourth level as low. Following May (1995) and Degeorge et al. (2004), we use tenure
as a proxy for the firm-specificity of human capital. Firm-specificity of Human Capital is
measured by the number of years an employee works for the option granting company.
We classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as low (high).
Loss Aversion reflects an employee’s degree of loss aversion based on a stated certainty
equivalent for a mixed lottery. Lower certainty equivalents hereby imply a lower degree
of loss aversion. We categorized answers into groups ranging from 1 to 4, with lower
values indicating a lower degree of loss aversion. Answers below the median response were
classified as low (low degree of loss aversion), and those equal to and above the median
response as high (high degree of loss aversion).
An employee’s degree of optimism about company stock is captured by Optimism Com-
pany. It is based on a forecasting question about the expected return for company stock
over a five-year horizon (responses in %). We classify answers below (equal to and above)
the median response as low (high). An employee’s degree of overconfidence (also called mis-
calibration) with regard to company stock, Overconfidence Company, is measured based
on a forecasting question about upper and lower bounds of the share price level of com-
pany stock over a five-year horizon. Following DeBondt (1998), we calculated the resulting
confidence intervals as the difference between the high forecast and the low forecast, di-
vided by the stock price level at the date of forecast and multiplied by 100. Answers below
(equal to and above) the median response were classified as high (low). Optimism Market
measures an employee’s general degree of optimism and is based on a forecasting ques-
tion about the expected return for the German stock market index DAX over a five-year
horizon. We again classify answers below (equal to and above) the median response as
low (high). Overconfidence Market reflects an employee’s degree of overconfidence based
on a forecasting question for upper and lower bounds of the index level of the German
stock market index DAX (once more over a five-year horizon). Confidence intervals were
again calculated using the methodology suggested by DeBondt (1998). We classify answers

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































An employee’s degree of wealth integration is captured by Narrow Bracketing. Employees
responded on a five-point scale with the endpoints “1 = no wealth integration” and “5 =
high level of wealth integration” on a question about their degree of narrow bracketing.
Higher values hereby imply a lower degree of narrow bracketing. We classify answers
below three (equal to and above) as high (low). We further measured how far employees
look ahead with respect to stock price changes and option values (Myopia). Employees
responded on a six-point scale with the endpoints “1 = less than a week” and “6 = more
than two years”. Answers below (above) two years are classified as high (low). Frequency
Supervision finally measures how often an employee checks the exercise gains he can
realize by exercising.27 Employees responded on a seven-point scale with the endpoints
“1 = several times a day” and “7 = less than once a month”. We consider answers below
(equal to and above) 5 as high (low).
Summary statistics on this set of individual characteristics are provided in Table 4. Apart
from the variables defined above, the table also includes information on the fraction of
total wealth invested in equity (Ratio Equity), and on the fraction of equity holdings
invested in company stock (Ratio Company Stock). The table contains means, medians,
minimums, maximums, and standard deviations of all variables. It further includes the
number of observations of the respective variables (Obs.).
The average individual invested 35.35% in the risky lottery (Risk Aversion 1 ). The mean
certainty equivalent for a 50% chance of winning 1,000,000 Euro and a 50% chance of
winning nothing was 250,000 Euro (Risk Aversion 2 ). On average, employees in our sam-
ple invested 7.60% of their total wealth in company stock (median = 5.25%, std.dev.
= 7.85%). As a fraction of his overall equity holdings, the average option holder has a
considerable investment in company stock (41.61%). This figure displays that most em-
ployees in our data set are highly undiversified. Their investment strategies contrast the
recommendations given by Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1964) who suggest that people
should hold well-diversified portfolios.28 Most people have been working for the company
for a period of more than 20 years, which even deteriorates their diversification problems.
27The company offered a web page where all employees can regularly check the gains they would realize by exercising.
28Recent research by Meulbroek (2002) has explicitly shown how considerable the costs of such an insufficient diversifica-
tion can be. Further evidence for non-diversification by employees can be found in the 401(k) literature, see Benartzi (2001)
or Huberman and Sengmu¨ller (2004) among others.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics on Individual Characteristics
This table provides summary statistics on an extensive set of individual characteristics. Among other variables,
it encompasses an individuals’ degree of risk aversion, his stockholdings, his wealth, his firm-specificity of
human capital, his optimism, and overconfidence. The variables are defined in Table 3. The table also includes
information on the fraction of total wealth that is invested in equity (Ratio Equity). Moreover, it contains the
percentage of equity holdings that is invested in company stock (Ratio Company Stock). The table contains
means, medians, minimums, maximums, and standard deviations of all variables. It further includes the number
of observations of the respective variables (Obs.). Summary statistics were calculated on the basis of 62 returned
questionnaires (and on the basis of confidential information provided by the company (Wealth)).
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std.dev. Obs.
Risk Aversion 1 (in %) 35.35 30.00 0.00 100.00 28.65 62
Risk Aversion 2 250,000 250,000 50,000 650,000 164,751 57
Ratio Equity (in %) 20.16 15.00 5.00 65.00 12.11 62
Ratio Company Stock (in %) 41.61 30.00 5.00 95.00 28.40 62
Stockholdings (in %) 7.60 5.25 0.75 48.75 7.85 62
Wealth 3.51 4.00 2.00 4.00 0.68 182
Firm-specificity of Human Capital 22.87 24.00 13.00 35.00 5.36 62
Loss Aversion 3.36 4.00 2.00 4.00 0.80 55
Optimism Company (in %) 20.41 22.65 -28.90 60.00 20.33 54
Overconfidence Company (in %) 47.61 40.88 7.11 106.65 26.61 46
Optimism Market (in %) 20.87 20.00 -31.50 59.93 19.67 54
Overconfidence Market (in %) 51.38 45.70 11.42 159.93 32.66 47
Narrow Bracketing 2.42 2.00 1.00 5.00 1.37 60
Myopia 4.90 5.00 2.00 6.00 1.18 61
Frequency Supervision 5.08 5.00 2.00 7.00 1.56 61
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Table 5: Relationship between Measures of Risk Aversion and Loss Aversion
This table presents pairwise correlations between Risk Aversion 1, Risk Aversion 2, and Loss Aversion. It
further includes the significance level of each correlation coefficient (in parentheses) as well as the number of
observations used in calculating the respective correlation coefficient. The variables are defined in Table 3. *
indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%.
Risk Risk Loss







Loss -0.3858*** -0.6880*** 1.0000
Aversion (0.0036) (0.0000)
55 53
The mean (median) value of tenure, our proxy for the Firm-specificity of Human Capital,
is 22.78 years (24.00 years). Employees in our sample are very loss averse on average:
the mean value of our categorial variable for loss aversion is equal to 3.36. The average
individual predicted a company stock return of 20.41% over the five-year horizon, with
responses varying heavily between -28.90% and 60% (Optimism Company). Expected re-
turns for the market index DAX (Optimism Market) turned out to be of similar size, with
a mean value of 20.87% and a minimum (maximum) of -31.50% (59.93%). The average
confidence interval is 47.61% for company stock (Overconfidence Company) and 51.38%
for the DAX (Overconfidence Market). Most managers suffer from Narrow Bracketing and
do not integrate their financial wealth (median = 2.00, mean 2.42). The median option
holder looks less than two years ahead with respect to stock price changes and option
values (Myopia), and checks his potential exercise gains several times a month (Frequency
Supervision).
Table 5 presents pairwise correlations between Risk Aversion 1, Risk Aversion 2, and
Loss Aversion. It shows that our measures of risk aversion are consistent in the sense that
higher risk aversion in the self-reporting treatment is significantly associated with higher
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risk aversion in the lottery treatment (Rho = 0.5462, p-value = 0.0000). Furthermore,
we find that a higher degree of risk aversion (according to both risk measures) is also
associated with a higher degree of loss aversion.
5 Exercise Decisions and Subjective Option Values: Determi-
nants and Consistency
5.1 Determinants of Exercise Decisions and Subjective Option Values
5.1.1 Theory and Predictions
This subsection derives testable predictions about the relationships between the individ-
ual variables presented above and sacrificed option lives/subjective option values. We
therefore employ insights from economic theory and evidence from behavioral economics.
It is well-known that standard option pricing models are not appropriate for determining
the value employees place on their stock options. Theoretical work has shown that risk
aversion, diversification, and wealth need to be taken into account to explain subjective
option values and the resulting exercise behavior of individuals in ESO plans. Option
values and exercise decisions are linked as lower individual option values lead to earlier
exercise decisions.29
The economic literature on individual behavior in ESO plans can be divided into two
branches. Some studies explicitly model subjective option values as a function of risk
aversion, diversification, and wealth, while other studies rather focus on the optimal exer-
cise decision, i.e. the explicit date of exercise, as a function of these variables (often in a
binomial set-up). Examples for the first branch of models are the studies by Lambert et al.
(1991) and Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) which show that options values are decreasing
in risk aversion and company stockholdings but increasing in outside wealth. Examples
for the second branch of models are papers by Huddart (1994) or Carpenter (1998). They
demonstrate that more risk averse and less diversified individuals exercise stock options
29A stock option will generally be exercised whenever an employee’s expected utility from exercising is greater than the
expected utility form holding the option for another time period (see Huddart, 1994, Carpenter, 1998 or Bettis et al., 2005).
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at earlier points in time.30
An important conclusion from both modelling approaches is that differences in individual
characteristics can lead to significant heterogeneity in exercise decisions and option values
within an organization.31 Both approaches assume rationality on the part of the option
holder and make predictions that are consistent with each other, i.e. they predict the
same relationship between a certain variable and exercise decisions and subjective option
values.
So far, economic models predict that risk aversion, diversification, and wealth generally
affect exercises and option values. Sautner and Weber (2005) further argued that a higher
firm-specificity of human capital can also have an impact on individual behavior in ESO
plans. They reasoned that rational employees with a highly firm-specific human capital
discount option values more heavily and exercise earlier to diversify.
Beyond the four rational variables considered above, psychological variables are likely to
influence exercise decisions and subjective option values as well. Based on evidence in the
behavioral economics literature, natural candidates for these psychological factors are loss
aversion, optimism, overconfidence, narrow bracketing, myopia, and the frequency with
which options are evaluated.
Massey (2003b) argues that greater loss aversion is associated with lower option values
(and hence earlier exercises). Loss aversion causes employees to put more weight on po-
tential losses than on potential gains.32 As stock options can either appreciate or decrease
in value relative to a certain reference point (e.g. relative to past exercise gains), more loss
averse individuals will consider the lottery structure implied in options as less attractive
and hence discount option values more heavily (resulting in earlier exercise decisions).
Exercise decisions and ESO values may also vary across employees because of differences
in the individual level of optimism. Optimistic employees believe that future stock returns
30In these models, the optimal exercise policy is determined by using backward induction through the binomial tree
starting at the expiration date.
31Bettis et al. (2005) and Hemmer et al. (1996) have shown that exercises further depend on firm characteristics such as
dividend payments or stock price volatilities. We disregard these aspects as we do not study a cross-section of firms but
rather focus on individual-level variables within one organization.
32See Kahnemann and Tversky (1979).
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are higher than they actually are. As subjective option values are increasing in the un-
derlying stock price, overoptimistic employees place higher values on their stock options
and exercise at later dates compared to less optimistic colleagues.33
If employees are overconfident, i.e. if they assign confidence intervals to their estimates of
quantities that are too tight, this will have two effects on option values and exercises: on
the one hand, it reduces value as the convexity of an option’s payoff is underestimated,
while on the other hand, it also increases value as the risk underlying options is misper-
ceived (see Henderson, 2002).34 Which of these two effects actually dominates and whether
overconfidence overall has a positive or negative impact on option values and exercises is
therefore an empirical question.
Our subsequent analysis further includes a variable that captures the extent by which
employees suffer from narrow bracketing. Massey (2003b) uses prospect theory to argue
that narrow bracketing affects option values and exercise activity. He claims that an
individual that does not integrate his stock options into his total wealth will consider
ESOs as less attractive and will therefore lower his subjective valuation of a given option
package. Myopia is related to the concept of narrow bracketing as it can be considered as a
form of narrow bracketing over time. Following the argumentation in Sautner and Weber
(2005), we predict that individuals with very myopic perspectives concerning stock price
changes will regard ESOs as less attractive and will therefore exercise at earlier dates. We
further study whether the frequency by which an individual observes potential exercise
gains on the firm’s web page is also associated with his personal option values and his
actual exercise decisions.
Having considered a set of rational and psychological variables that are supposed to affect
subjective option values and exercise decisions, we can now formulate the hypothesis that
we want to test empirically:
Hypothesis 1 (Determinants of Exercise Decisions and Option Values):
33Evidence suggesting that people regularly believe that more favorable events occur more often than they actually do
can be found in Weinstein (1980) or Ito (1990). Sautner and Weber (2005) present evidence for overoptimism in stock option
programs.
34For details and related literature showing that overconfidence is a strong phenomenon in finance, see Sautner and Weber
(2005) or Glaser and Weber (2004).
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Economic theory and psychological evidence predict that subjective option values and ex-
ercise policies significantly depend on risk aversion, stockholdings, wealth, firm-specificity
of human capital, loss aversion, optimism, overconfidence, narrow bracketing, myopia, and
the frequency by which potential exercise gains are supervised.
Table 6 summarizes the predicted relationships and reports whether the prediction is
based on a rational model or on psychological evidence and reasoning. “+” means that
a model or theory predicts an increase in the subjective option value and hence a later
exercise decision with an increase in the respective variable. “-” likewise means that a
model or theory predicts a decrease in the subjective option value and hence an earlier
exercise decision with an increase in the variable. “?” means that no testable prediction
is possible ex ante. Note that if the relationship is predicted to be positive, we expect the
sign of the subjective option value to be positive but that of Option Life Sacrificed to
be negative (as a higher option value means a later exercise decision and hence a lower
number for the variable measuring the sacrificed option life).
5.1.2 Results
Having presented predicted relationships between various personal traits and exercise
decisions/option values, we can now formally test whether these expected associations
really hold in our data set.
Table 7 presents correlation coefficients (Spearman’s Rho) between the individual-level
characteristics and (i) Option Life Sacrificed for g=1, (ii) Option Life Sacrificed for g=2,
and (iii) the subjective option values for g=3.35 It further includes the significance level of
each correlation as well as the number of observations used in calculating the respective
correlation coefficient (Obs.). Note again that if the predicted relationship was positive,
we expect the sign of the subjective option value to be positive but that of the variable
Option Life Sacrificed to be negative.
The correlation analysis provides only little evidence supporting the rational option mod-
els presented in the previous subsection: both measures of risk aversion are unrelated with
35Given the size of the data set and taking missing values into account, we passed on doing regression or duration data
analysis.
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Table 6: Predicted Relationship between Stock Option Exercise, Subjective Stock Option
Value, and Individual Characteristics
This table reports predicted relationships between various rational and psychological variables and exercise
decisions/subjective stock option values. “+” means that a model or theory predicts an increase in the sub-
jective option valuation and hence a later exercise decision with an increase in the variable. “-” means that a
model or theory predicts a decrease in the subjective option valuation and hence an earlier exercise decision










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the option lives that were sacrificed as well as with subjective option values. This finding
is consistent with the results in Sautner and Weber (2005) who also find no association
between risk aversion and exercise decisions using individual-level data. Higher holdings
of company stock are surprisingly associated with higher option values which is incon-
sistent with our hypothesized direction.36 As predicted, we find that option values are
decreasing in the firm-specificity of human capital. The correlations between our proxy
for wealth and both measures of early exercise are negative and significant, suggesting
that individual with more outside wealth hold their options shorter.37 Taken together,
our results indicate that rational economic variables are only poorly related to exercise
decisions and subjective option values.
Our findings, however, show that psychological factors are more heavily correlated with
subjective option values (but surprisingly not with exercise decisions). Consistent with the
prediction in Massey (2003b), we find that more loss averse individuals put lower values
on their ESOs. Moreover, both optimism and overconfidence measures are significantly
correlated with the option values elicited: more optimistic and less overconfident managers
place higher values on their options compared to less optimistic and more overconfident
managers. The coefficients for optimism have the anticipated signs and our results are con-
sistent with the sentiment hypothesis presented in Oyer and Schaefer (2004) and Bergman
and Jenter (2004). Their theories suggested that excessive optimism causes individuals
to overvalue stock options. Furthermore, our overconfidence results are in line with the
findings in Sautner and Weber (2005) and indicate that the overconfidence (measured as
miscalibration) significantly affects option values.
Opposed to our prediction, we find no evidence suggesting that narrow bracketing and
36Surprisingly, we find that the RSI variable of both grants is neither significantly correlated with the stated option values
nor with the sacrificed option lives. Regarding the determinants of the required stock investment, our data suggests that
both RSI variables are significantly positively correlated with holdings of company stock. Moreover, they are significantly
negatively correlated with the firm-specificity of human capital and with loss aversion. The latter correlations imply that
individuals that have a highly firm-specific human capital and that are very loss averse introduced less shares of company
stock into the ESO program. Thus, they also received a smaller number of options. The correlations with the first two
variables are significant at the 1%-level (apart from one correlation between the RSI in g=1 and the HC variable which was
significant at the 10%-level), while the correlations with the latter variable (loss aversion) are significant at the 5%-level.
All other individual-level variables were not significantly correlated with the RSI variables.
37Recall that wealth is proxied by the grade level in the firm. Higher grades (lower value of the variable Wealth) imply
higher levels of wealth.
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myopia are related to option values and exercise decisions. The coefficient estimate of the
frequency by which employees supervise their exercise gains is, however, significantly cor-
related with option valuations. The more often individuals checks their potential exercise
gains, the higher they value their option packages. Although not reported in this table,
we further find that those individuals that have a higher number of unexercised options,
place higher values on their ESOs.
Table 8 complements the results in Table 7 and records sacrificed option lives and sub-
jective option values partitioned by whether the realization of a certain rational or psy-
chological variable is high or low. It further presents p-values of a two-sample Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney test) comparing the mean values of a certain variable for
the high and low realizations. The variables and their respective realizations (high/low)
are defined in Table 3.38 The findings reinforce our conclusion that risk aversion only
poorly explains the observed variation in exercise decisions and option values. The dif-
ferences for sacrificed option lives and option values are neither economically large nor
statistically significant for the two risk aversion groups.39 The table also shows that the
option value of a loss averse individual is 29.81 Euro compared with 33.96 Euro for a less
loss averse person (p-value = 0.0865). Individuals who are optimistic about the stock mar-
ket value their option with 33.52 Euro, while less optimistic managers placed an average
value of only 28.96 Euro on their ESOs (the difference is statistically different with p-value
= 0.0513).40 The results for our overconfidence variables confirm the general conclusions
we drew on the basis of the correlation analysis in Table 7.
38Note that the analysis in Table 8 uses less information than the correlation analysis in Table 7. It is therefore not
surprising that some variables turned out to be significant in the correlation analysis but not in grouping analysis.
39This is the case for both measures of risk aversion.
40The average option value for employees that are very optimistic about company stock is also economically higher than





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 Intertemporal Consistency of Exercise Decisions
5.2.1 Theory and Predictions
Having studied determinants of option values and exercise decisions, the question arises
whether employees exercise their options over time in a way that is economically consis-
tent. An understanding of changes or stability of exercise behavior over time is crucial
for various reasons. It is, for example, important for a precise estimation of the expected
lifetime of new option grants which is needed for the valid estimation of the accounting
costs of stock options. Accounting rules allow firms to use past exercise data to estimate
to expected life of newly granted options. If exercises change heavily over time, then
using past exercise patterns to predict the future expected lifetime of options is rather
problematic.
We have seen in the previous subsection that the exercise behavior of an individual i is
driven by a vector of personal characteristics (let this vector be Xi). Xi includes variables
that were derived from rational ESO models as well as from psychological evidence, i.e. Xi
= (Risk Aversion, Stockholdings, Wealth, Loss Aversion, Optimism, ...)’. This parameter
vector naturally influences individuals’ exercise decisions both in the first and in the second
option grant. If we assume that the elements of the vector are constant over time, then
economic theory suggests that exercise decisions should be intertemporally consistent.41
Intertemporal consistency thereby means that the sacrificed option lives of individual i
should be statistically the same across the two ESO grants. If, for example, risk aversion of
individual i is assumed to be constant over time, then it should have on average the same
effect on the sacrificed option life in the first and in the second grant. The same reasoning
applies to the remaining set of variables and hence to entire vector Xi. This leads us to the
following hypothesis on the intertemporal consistency of individuals’ exercise decisions:
Hypothesis 2 (Time Consistent Exercise Behavior):
If we assume that the variables influencing the exercise decisions are constant over time,
then sacrificed option lives have to be statistically the same across the two option grants.
41For evidence supporting the underlying assumption, see, e.g., Glaser et al. (2004). Moreover, we have to assume that
firm characteristics and potential macroeconomic determinants also stay constant over time. Given the short time horizon
we study, these assumptions should be rather unproblematic.
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5.2.2 Results
To investigate whether individuals really act intertemporally consistent, we first calculated
correlation coefficients between the sacrificed option lives in g=1 and g=2. The respective
correlation coefficient equals 0.4429 and is significant at the 1%-level (p-value = 0.0000,
n = 131). This correlation suggests that individuals that exercised early in one grant
also did so in the second one. A linear regression of Option Life Sacrificed in g=1 on
Option Life Sacrificed in g=2 confirms our results.42 However, the hypothesis that the
coefficient of Option Live Sacrificed in g=2 is equal to one, which would imply the perfect
intertemporal consistency of option exercises, can be rejected at the 10%-level using a
standard F-Test (p-value = 0.0805).
Figure 9 plots the distribution of the differences in the sacrificed option lives between the
first and the second option grant (Difference ≡ Option Life Sacrificed g=2 - Option Life
Sacrificed g=1). The mean (median) value of this differences equals 0.031 (0.067), and the
hypothesis that the difference is equal to 0 can be rejected at the 1%-level. This evidence
further supports the conclusion that individuals’ exercises are in general not perfectly
consistent over time.43
We can therefore summarize that we have found some evidence for the consistency in
exercise patterns over time: sacrificed option lives were significantly positively correlated
across the two ESO grants. However, we found no evidence for a perfect intertemporal
consistency and can therefore reject the hypothesis that employees show identical exercise
patterns over time.44
42Option Life Sacrificedg=1 = 0.155 + 0.761 Option Life Sacrificedg=2, with R2 = 0.1961, n = 131, and with the
coefficient of the regressor being significant at the 1%-level.
43An individual-level analysis shows that twenty-six individuals exercised options from the two grants at the same day,
while 14 more individuals exercised within +/- 3 days.
44An alternative explanation of our finding would be that the parameter vector Xi has changed over time. Given the
non-panel structure of our survey data set, we unfortunately can not test whether time-varying individual characteristics
account for our findings.
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5.3 Consistency of Exercise Decisions and Subjective Option Values
5.3.1 Theory and Predictions
Having studied intertemporal option exercises, we now turn to the question whether option
valuations revealed by individuals’ exercise decisions and subjective option valuations
elicited in our survey are also consistent with each other. This type of analysis is important
as some researches focus in their modelling approaches on subjective option values, while
others rather look at individual-level exercise decisions.
We have seen in Subsection 5.1 that both modelling approaches make consistent predic-
tions for a given vector of individual characteristics Xi: lower option values are associated
with earlier exercise decisions. As a consequence, we expect that rational individuals act
consistently in the sense that those people that place high values on their stock options
also exercise at later points in time. This prediction once again builds on the assump-
tion that the individual characteristics are stable over time. We can hence formulate the
following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Exercise Behavior and Subjective Option Values):
If we assume that the variables influencing both exercise decisions and subjective option
values are constant over time, then higher option values are significantly associated with
later exercise decisions.
5.3.2 Results
Table 9 presents pairwise correlations between the two Option Life Sacrificed variables
(for g=1 and g=2) and the subjective option values (for g=3). It further includes the
significance level of each correlation coefficient (in parentheses) as well as the number
of observations used in calculating the correlation coefficient (Obs.). It shows that both
exercise measures are negatively correlated with the stated option values (Rho = -0.4467
and Rho = -0.0373, respectively). Even though the coefficients show the predicted signs,
the correlation coefficient for the second grant is economically very low and statistically
insignificant. If we run a simple regression of the elicited option values on Option Life
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Table 9: Relationship between Exercise Decisions and Subjective Option Values
This table presents pairwise correlations between the variable Option Life Sacrificed (in g=1 and g=2) and
the elicited subjective option values (for g=3). It further includes the significance level of each correlation
coefficient (in parentheses) as well as the number of observations used in calculating the correlation coefficient
(Obs.). * indicates significance at 10%, ** indicates significance at 5%, *** indicates significance at 1%.
Option Life Option Life
Sacrificed (g=1) Sacrificed (g=2)
Subjective Rho -0.4467*** -0.0373
Option Value p-value (0.0003) (0.7752)
(g=3) Obs. 61 61
Sacrificed in g=1 and g=2, respectively, we find similar results that also suggest that
exercises and option values are only weakly related.45
We can therefore conclude that higher subjective option values are associated with later
exercise decisions only in the first ESO grant. The results for the second grant show that
exercise decisions and option values are not significantly related. Our evidence of this
subsection therefore provide only weak support for our hypothesis on the cross-sectional
consistency of exercise decisions and option values.
6 Conclusion
Stock option programs constitute an important economic domain both for the issuing
companies and for their employees. Little is known, however, about which individual vari-
ables actually drive exercise patterns, and how employees value their stock options. This
lack of research is merely due to data limitations about employee-by-employee exercise
transactions and subjective option values. Understanding these topics is crucial for various
45Regression results for the first grant: Subjective Option Value = 43.35 - 14.97 Option Life Sacrificedg=1, with R2 =
0.1996, n = 61, and with both the coefficient of Option Life Sacrificedg=1 and the intercept being significant at the 1%-
level. Regression results for the second grant: Subjective Option Value = 32.03 - 1.01 Option Life Sacrificedg=2. The R2
of this regression is extremely low (R2 = 0.0014), and the coefficient of our exercise variable is not only low but also highly
insignificant (p-value = 0.775).
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reasons ranging from estimation procedures for the accounting costs of ESO programs to
efficient contracting.
We studied the following set of related research questions to provide a contribution to a
better understanding of the mechanics behind exercises decisions and option values: How
do employees exercise and value stock options? What are the determinants of exercise de-
cisions and subjective option values? Do individuals exercise options from different grants
in a consistent way? Are subjective option values consistent with individuals’ exercise
decisions?
To study these issues, we were able to use a unique data set combing individual-level option
exercises with survey-based subjective option values and detailed personal characteristics
on a wide set of variables.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Employees in our data set exercised
their stock options well before expiration. The median individual sacrificed more than
90% of the option’s lifetime by exercising early. Employees hereby sacrificed a significant
proportion of the option’s fair value (about 20%). Interestingly, we found that employees
exercising at later points in time made a higher per-option profit than those exercising
earlier. When individuals were asked how they subjectively value a real stock option, they
stated values that were substantially above the fair option value. The average manager
assigned a value of 31.21 Euro to an option with a fair value of roughly 26 Euro. Our
survey data suggested that the employees in our data set are highly undiversified with
almost 42% of their equity holdings invested in company stock. The average individual
predicted a company stock return of 20.87% over a five-year horizon with responses varying
heavily between -28.90% and 60%. Moreover, most of the managers suffered from narrow
bracketing and were very loss averse.
Turning to the question of how individual characteristics affect exercises and option val-
ues, we found that measures of risk aversion and exercise decisions are unrelated. This
finding is inconsistent with rational option models that use risk aversion as a core ingre-
dient to rationalize early exercises. We also found no statistically significant relationship
between subjective option values and risk aversion. Loss aversion did a better job than
risk aversion in explaining the heterogeneity in option values. We found that employees
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with a highly firm-specific human capital discounted their options more heavily. More-
over, we provided evidence suggesting that more wealthy managers exercise later as they
have more funds to diversify. Overall, our results indicated that psychological variables
are significantly correlated with elicited option values (but surprisingly not with exercise
decisions). More specifically, we found that optimism and overconfidence measures were
significantly related to option values. We documented that managers that are very opti-
mistic about company stock place higher values on their ESOs. This finding is consistent
with the sentiment hypothesis presented in Oyer and Schaefer (2004) and Bergman and
Jenter (2004). Their models suggested that excessive optimism causes individuals to over-
value ESOs. We also found that more overconfident employees put lower values on stock
options which is consistent with the findings in Sautner and Weber (2005) and the theory
in Henderson (2002).
Regarding the question whether employees exercise options from different grants in a
consistent way, we provided some evidence for an intertemporal consistency of option
exercises. When employees exercise early in one grant, they also do so in a second one.
However, we found no evidence for a perfect consistency in exercise patterns and rejected
the hypothesis that employees show identical exercise behavior over time. Turning to our
last research question, we offered only weak support for the hypothesis that higher option
values are generally associated with later exercise decisions. This finding is surprising
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Figure 1: Exercise Pattern over Time (Aktiengesellschaft)
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Figure 2: Exercise Pattern over Time (Group)
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